USA v. David Dunham, Jr. by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-20-2021 
USA v. David Dunham, Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. David Dunham, Jr." (2021). 2021 Decisions. 769. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/769 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 






UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
  
No. 20-2686 
   
 




DAVID M. DUNHAM, JR., 
      Appellant 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 5-15-cr-00602-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl 
________________ 
 
Argued on June 3, 2021 
 
Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 20, 2021) 
 
Shon Hopwood [Argued] 
Kyle Singhal 
Ann M. Hopwood  
Hopwood & Singhal 
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,  
Suite 200 
Washington, DC 20006 
   Counsel for Appellant 
 
Jennifer Arbittier Williams  
Robert A. Zauzmer  
Mary E. Crawley  
Office of United States Attorney 





Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
Jennifer S. Neumann 
John Smeltzer 
Jean E. Williams  
Adam C. Cullman  
Thekla Hansen-Young [Argued] 
United States Department of Justice 
Environment & Natural Resources Division 
P.O. Box 7415 
Washington, DC 20044 
   Counsel for Appellee 
 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 A jury found David Dunham Jr. guilty on various counts of fraud, false tax filings, 
and obstruction.  The convictions were in connection with using his alternative fuels 
businesses to obtain improper subsidies, grants and tax credits.  Dunham appeals, arguing 
that the District Court should have dismissed his indictment because the Government 
engaged in outrageous misconduct by inviting him to attend three proffer meetings 
despite being aware of a potential conflict of interest affecting his then-attorney.  In the 
alternative, he argues the Court should have held an evidentiary hearing to explore this 
issue.  As the outrageous government misconduct defense is reserved for only the most 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




egregious circumstances, and Dunham’s allegations, even if true, do not meet that high 
bar, we reject his arguments and affirm his convictions.    
I. 
 For over two decades, Dunham made his living in the alternative fuels industry.  
He first founded Smarter Fuel, Inc. on his own, and then in 2010 launched Greenworks 
Holdings, LLC with codefendant Ralph Tommaso.  The businesses were billed as green 
energy enterprises.  Among other things, they collected, processed, and resold used oil 
from restaurants.  Through his businesses, Dunham took advantage of various federal 
programs run by the Environmental Protection Agency, Internal Revenue Service, and 
U.S. Department of Agriculture—in the form of subsidies, grants and tax credits—
intended to incentivize the production of alternative fuels.  The intricacies of these 
programs are complex, but (as Dunham acknowledges) they “are not in dispute” in this 
appeal.  Dunham’s Br. at 7.  
 Since its inception, Greenworks paid Michael McAdams, a Washington lobbyist, 
for consulting services regarding tax credits and other regulatory issues.  App. A8, Dist. 
Ct. Op. at 2.  McAdams had a law degree but never practiced as an attorney, though in 
2011 he joined the law firm Holland & Knight (“H&K”) as a “Senior Policy Advisor.”  
App. A195.  Dunham hired H&K to provide “legal services in connection with fuel 
regulatory support” to Greenworks, with McAdams “lead[ing]” the team.  App. A192–
93; Dist. Ct. Op. at 2. 
 In July 2012, the Government, as part of an investigation, executed search 




Dunham hired John Brownlee, a white-collar criminal defense partner at H&K.  Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 2.  Although McAdams and Brownlee were in the same law firm, and thus 
Brownlee may have been inclined to shield McAdams and the firm from liability, 
Brownlee never obtained a conflict waiver from Dunham.  He asserts Brownlee 
encouraged him to negotiate a plea deal.  Based on that advice, Dunham agreed to attend 
proffer meetings with the Government.  Before those meetings, he signed a letter 
including the standard acknowledgment that, if he ever testified at trial, “the 
[G]overnment may cross-examine [him], introduce rebuttal evidence and make 
representations based on [proffered] statements,” which “helps to assure [Dunham] does 
not abuse the opportunity for an ‘off-the-record’ proffer . . . [and] make materially false 
statements.”  App. A205.   
 Dunham attended three proffer meetings on July 9, 2013, December 5, 2013, and 
January 2, 2014.  He now argues that the Government believed he revealed damning 
information at these meetings he would not have revealed with conflict-free counsel.  For 
example, Dunham allegedly admitted he “was not adding diesel to his product as was 
required under the terms of the USDA program.”  Dunham’s Br. at 17–18 (citing App. 
A210).   
Following the third meeting, the Government asked him to acknowledge in writing 
that there may be a conflict of interest due to Brownlee and McAdams’ membership in 
the same law firm.  Dunham refused and hired new counsel.  
 In December 2015, the Government charged Dunham with various counts of 




were later dismissed on the Government’s motion.  At a high level, the indictment alleged 
that Dunham and Tommaso defrauded the federal government of tax credits and grant 
monies.  Dist. Ct. Op. at 1–2.  Prior to trial, Dunham’s new counsel moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that the Government improperly exploited Brownlee’s alleged 
conflict of interest.  The District Court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.  
It further granted the Government’s motion in limine, thus allowing the Government to 
introduce statements made by Dunham during the proffer sessions to rebut any 
contradictory statements made by him at trial.  App. A22.   
Following a sixteen-day jury trial, the jury convicted Dunham on all but one 
count.  The District Court sentenced him to eighty-four months of imprisonment.  Suppl. 
App. 606–14.  He appeals his convictions to us.1   
II. 
 When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment, 
we review its legal conclusions anew and its factual findings for clear error.  United 
States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 (3d Cir. 1996).  Dunham argues that the indictment 
should be dismissed because the Government committed outrageous misconduct by 
exploiting Brownlee’s alleged conflict of interest.  Dunham’s Br. at 25.    
 Since 1952, the Supreme Court has recognized “that outrageous misconduct by 
law enforcement officers in detecting and obtaining incriminating evidence could rise to 
the level of a due process violation.”  Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1064 (citing Rochin v. California, 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this criminal matter under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 




342 U.S. 165 (1952)).  As the descriptors indicate, that bar is very high, as the conduct 
must be “‘so outrageous’ as to be ‘shocking to the universal sense of justice.’”  United 
States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 177–78 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Russell, 
411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973)).  Moreover, the defendant, and not the Government, bears 
“both the burden of production and persuasion.”  Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1070.  Although our 
Court continues to recognize the existence of the outrageous misconduct doctrine, it is 
reserved for “only the most intolerable government conduct.”  Id. at 1065 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 608 (3d Cir. 1982)).  We 
previously remarked that “courts have rejected its application with almost monotonous 
regularity,” see id. (quoting United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993)), and 
that its “viability . . . is hanging by a thread,” see United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 
F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 1998).  Indeed, we have identified only one instance of outrageous 
misconduct, more than forty years ago in United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 
1978), where the Government’s behavior bordered on entrapment.   
 Here, Dunham’s allegations ask us to consider when the Government’s 
interference with an attorney-client relationship results in a constitutional claim of 
outrageous misconduct.  In Voigt, we set out a three-prong test, requiring the defendant to 
show “(1) the government’s objective awareness of an ongoing, personal attorney-client 
relationship . . . ; (2) deliberate intrusion into that relationship; and (3) actual and 
substantial prejudice.”  89 F.3d at 1067.2   
 
2 Alternatively, Dunham claims we can conclude the Government’s conduct was 




 Even if we accept Dunham’s allegations as true, they do not come close to 
satisfying the three prongs of Voigt.  Under the first prong, the Government must have 
been objectively aware of an actual conflict of interest afflicting Dunham’s counsel, 
Brownlee.  See United States v. Kossak, 178 F. App’x 183, 186 (3d Cir. 2006).  At the 
outset, we are not convinced an actual conflict existed at all.  To establish it, Dunham 
must demonstrate Brownlee “actively represented conflicting interests” that “adversely 
affected his [] performance.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) 
(quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980)).  McAdams was never prosecuted 
or investigated for misconduct, nor did the Government ever call him as a material 
witness.  Further, testimony at trial suggests that Dunham hid his unlawful activity from 
McAdams.  See, e.g., Suppl. App. 191–95.  Even if McAdams or H&K had criminal 
exposure, Brownlee would have had the incentive to protect, rather than betray, Dunham, 
because implicating him could have increased suspicion of McAdams.  Put another way, 
McAdams’ interests were aligned with rather than divergent from Dunham’s own. 
 As for the second prong, the Government’s actions fall well short of being a 
“deliberate intrusion.”  Its behavior here is more akin to “passive tolerance” (which is 
permissible) than “active encouragement of impropriety” (which is cause for concern).  
Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1066.  “We are aware of no authority . . . imposing an affirmative duty 
 
Dunham’s Br. at 49.  We decline to analyze this argument separately, as it seeks an 
unnecessary and duplicative inquiry.  “Fundamental fairness” is simply a shorthand for 
the Supreme Court’s explanation that outrageous misconduct must violate “fundamental 
fairness, [and be] shocking to the universal sense of justice.”  Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1065 




on the Government to inform a suspect that he has a potential conflict of interest with his 
attorney.”  Kossak, 178 F. App’x at 186.  Further, unlike in Voigt where only the 
Government was aware of the conflicting interests (as it was secretly using the 
defendant’s attorney as an informant), Dunham had all the information to assess whether 
there was an actual conflict.  Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1062–63.   
 Finally, Dunham fails to show the Government’s misconduct actually and 
substantially prejudiced him.  He essentially argues that he said too much at the proffer 
sessions, and that if he were represented by conflict-free counsel, he would have kept 
quiet or not participated at all.  But even without the proffer meetings, the Government 
could have elicited the same testimony from Dunham on cross-examination.  The 
Government’s case was further supported by twenty witnesses and ample documentary 
evidence.  Suppl. App. 406, 409–10.  In any event, Dunham never explains how 
Brownlee led him astray.  At no point did he allege that Brownlee asked him not to 
mention McAdams or to provide untrue testimony to protect McAdams and H&K.  See 
Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1070 (holding there is no prejudice when the defendant “does not cite 
even a single occasion on which [his attorney] gave him legal advice that was calculated 
to damage him to the benefit of the government”). 
 Even accepting Dunham’s allegations as true, we conclude that there is no 
outrageous misconduct justifying dismissal of the indictment.  As a result, we also reject 
his argument that the District Court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary 
hearing.  See United States v. Scripps, 961 F.3d 626, 631–32 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining 




“colorable claim.”  Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1067 (quoting United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 
424 (3d Cir. 1994)).3  For the reasons explained above, he did not.  
*    *    *    *    * 
 A defense of outrageous government misconduct is disfavored and burdens the 
defendant with a typically insurmountable bar.  Dunham falls well short here.  We thus 
affirm his conviction.    
 
3 We also reject Dunham’s assertion that the District Court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing to explore whether his lawyer’s purported conflict of interest 
prevented Dunham from knowingly and voluntarily waiving his rights under Fed. R. 
Crim P. 11(f) and Fed. R. Evid. 410 by signing the proffer agreement, which allowed the 
Government to use his proffered statements against him if he provided conflicting 
testimony at trial.  This argument is not colorable because, as noted above, Dunham did 
not adequately allege a conflict of interest.  See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 
196, 210 (1995) (“[A]bsent some affirmative indication that the agreement was entered 
into unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of 
the plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable.”).  
